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Mexico’s market reforms
in historical perspective
Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid and Jaime Ros
T his paper examines Mexico’s main economic policies and
problems during the last two centuries. Focusing on episodes of radical
shifts in development strategy concerning the role of the market and the
State, it argues that Mexico’s real obstacles to development have often
been misperceived, and such misperception may be occurring today.
This argument is tested, initially, by reviewing the causes of Mexico’s
economic stagnation during most of the nineteenth century. The period
of economic expansion between 1940 and 1981, which ended with the
collapse of the oil boom in 1981 is also examined. A critical review is
made of the radical shift in development strategy implemented in the
mid-1980s in response to the external debt crisis associated with the
apparent exhaustion of the strategy of import substitution and State-led
industrialization. Finally, some thoughts are presented on the current
challenges faced by the Mexican economy when, after more than 15
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This paper looks at Mexico’s development policies and
problems from a historical perspective. It reviews long-
term trends in the Mexican economy, with particular
attention to some past episodes of radical shifts in
development strategy and in the role of the market and
the State, especially in the last twenty years. A major
theme is that the real obstacles to economic development
have often been misperceived in the past and that the
same may be happening at present. The paper is
organized as follows. After a brief introduction, section
II reviews the debates on the causes behind Mexico’s
long period of economic stagnation during most of the
nineteenth century. Section III examines the long period
of expansion of the Mexican economy that began with
the Porfiriato,1 in the late nineteenth century, and ended
with the collapse of a short-lived oil boom in 1981.
Section IV focuses on the performance of the Mexican
economy after the radical shift in development strategy
in the mid-1980s. The paper ends with some thoughts
on the challenges facing the Mexican economy today,
when after almost two decades of far-reaching
economic reform it is still not able to embark on a
process of sustained rapid growth. Even worse, for the
first time in its modern history it is about to experience
three successive years of absolute decline in its real per
capita GDP.
■  This paper is an extended and revised version of an essay
published by the authors nearly ten years ago, at the time that the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was put in place
(see Moreno-Brid and Ros, 1994). It was presented at the Latin
American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA) meeting in
Cholula, Mexico, on 10 October 2003. The authors wish to
acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Rubén Guerrero
and the comments on a previous version made by Ted Beatty,
Rolando Cordera, Amitava Dutt, Julie Lennox, Ajit Singh, Carlos
Tello, Samuel Valenzuela and Jeff Williamson. The opinions
expressed herein do not necessarily coincide with those of the United
Nations.
1
 Mexican historians give this title to the 33-year dictatorship of
Porfirio Díaz (1877-1910).
2
 According to INEGI (1985), in 1790 the share of manufacturing
employment was 10%.
II
The market reforms in the nineteenth century
By the end of the 18th century Mexico was probably
one of the most prosperous regions in the world. It was
surely one of the wealthiest Spanish colonies in
America, with an economy whose productivity was
possibly higher than that of Spain herself. Output per
capita (in 1800) was around half that of the United
States, and Mexico’s economy was less agricultural,
with an advanced mining industry and a significant
manufacturing sector. The value of the country’s
exports was similar to that of its northern neighbour,
even though the total output produced was around half
(Coatsworth, 1978). Several of the conditions for rapid
capitalist development were in place. The creation of
an industrial labour force —that ‘most difficult and
protracted process’ by which the population’s ties to
the land are broken (Gerschenkron, 1952)— although
far from complete, was probably more advanced than
in many European countries (especially in Central and
Eastern Europe). The relatively high share of
manufacturing in total output in 1800 (22.3%, see
table 1)2 also indicates the presence of a critical mass
of native industrial entrepreneurs (table 1).
1. Mexico’s Century of Decline (1780-1870):
obstacles to economic development
This favourable position of the Mexican economy
began to deteriorate in the last few decades of the 18th
century, however. Although the exact moment at which
this deterioration began is a matter for debate, it is
generally agreed that Independence did nothing to
prevent the stagnation of the economy during the half
century that followed. Thus, between 1800 and
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TABLE 1
Mexico: Gross domestic product per capita and by sector, 1800-1910
1800 1845 1860 1877 1895 1910
Per capita GDP at constant
1900 prices (index 1800 = 100) 100.0 78.4 70.9 85.0 128.8 190.2
% of GDP
Agriculturea 44.4 48.1 42.1 42.2 38.2 33.7
Mining 8.2  6.2  9.7 10.4  6.3  8.4
Manufacturing 22.3 18.3 21.6 16.2 12.8 14.9
Construction  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.8
Transportation  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.3  2.7
Commerce  16.7 16.9 16.7 16.9 16.8 19.3
Government  4.2b  7.4  6.8 11.2  8.9  7.2
Other  1.1 – – –  13.1  12.9
Source: Coatsworth (1989), tables 4 and 5.
a Includes livestock, forestry and fishing.
b Excludes net fiscal remittances to the Spanish Treasury. Total government revenues, including these remittances, amounted to 7.8% of
colonial income.
TABLE 2
Mexico: Total and per capita GDP and population, 1820-1998
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1990 1998
Per capita GDPa 759 674 1 732 2 365 4 845 6 097 6 655
GDP gap (Mexico/United States) 0.60 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24
1820-1870 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1998
Per capita GDP growth rates (%) –0.2 2.2 0.9 3.2 1.3
Total GDP growth rates (%) 0.4 3.4 2.6 6.4 3.5
Population growth rates (%) 0.7 1.1 1.8 3.1 2.2
Source: Maddison (2001).
a Dollars at 1990 international prices.
approximately 1860 —at the time when the United
States and other now developed economies were
recording unprecedented rates of economic growth—
the total product of Mexico fell by 5% and per capita
income declined by as much as 30%. Between 1820
and 1870, Mexico’s per capita income fell from 60%
to 28% of that of the United States, and has since then
fluctuated between 24% and 33% (table 2).
Why didn’t independence and the emergence of
a national State provide greater stimuli to economic
development? Perhaps the most important reason was
the prolonged period of political instability and
continuous struggle between the conservative and liberal
factions.3 Half a century of civil and international wars
annihilated the potentially beneficial effects of
independence, while at the same time curtailing the
resources needed for the State and the private sector to
support the recovery of the mining sector and improve
the transport infrastructure in a country where the lack
of natural communications and the resulting high
transport costs had highly adverse effects on the
division of labour and regional specialization
(Coatsworth, 1990).
3
 In the 55 years between independence and the Porfiriato, the
presidency changed hands 75 times (Haber, 1989). The most
disastrous consequence of the prolonged civil strife was the loss to
the United States of half of the national territory in the mid-19th
century. Fifty years after the 1848 Treaty which ended the United
States-Mexico war, and also after the beginning of the California
“Gold Rush”, the mineral output of the lost territories alone exceeded
Mexico’s total GDP (Coatsworth, 1978).
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Independence eliminated the fiscal burden on the
gold and silver extracted from the colony. This had
been a substantial burden —estimated by Coatsworth
at 7.2% of total output around 1800— much higher,
for example, than the burden of British colonialism on
its North American colonies. Yet the end of Spanish
rule also brought some unexpected costs for the mining
sector that partly offset the removal of this burde.4 As
a consequence, silver production fell to less than one-
fifth of its initial level between 1812 and 1822, and the
mining sector did not recover its pre-independence
level of production until the 1860s (Cárdenas, 1985).
The depression of silver production had, in turn, other
important consequences for the economy. Besides the
contraction of all the activities linked to the mining
sector, it implied a reduction in the volume of
international trade and a decrease in the means of
payment available in the domestic economy (Cárdenas,
1985). This aggravated the consequences of the capital
flight brought about by the exodus of Spanish miners
and merchants, and thus the general lack of financial
capital which characterized this period up to the 1860s,
when the first commercial banks were founded.
The abolition of restrictions on foreign trade also
turned out to be a mixed blessing. While generally
regarded by economic historians as beneficial for the
Mexican economy, the end of trade restrictions
accelerated the diversion of Mexican foreign trade
away from Spain and towards the emerging
industrializing powers in the North Atlantic: a trend
which had very harmful effects on domestic
manufacturing and, therefore, on the main activity
that could have compensated for the decline of the
mining sector. Several studies have documented how
exposure to United States and British competition led
to the collapse of the wool textile industry at the turn
of the century and to the prolonged decline of cotton
textiles throughout the first half of the 19th century.
Trade openness towards the Atlantic economy and
foreign competition —which in fact started in the
period of ‘comercio libre’ and ‘comercio neutral’
introduced by the Bourbon reforms— also appears to
have deepened the fragmentation of local markets and
the cleavage between, on the one hand, a mining and
agricultural North trading with the rest of the world
and, on the other, a manufacturing Centre and
agricultural South plunged into economic depression
(Thomson, 1986).
In addition, little progress was made in other
areas. The colony had been one of the regions in the
world with the sharpest social and regional disparities:
a caste society, in fact, where access to employment
as well as geographical and occupational mobility were
restricted on the basis of ethnic distinctions, and where
a number of institutional arrangements tended to
increase, rather than reduce, the gap between the private
and social benefits of economic activity. Although some
changes did take place with independence,5 many of
these had little effect in a backward social and political
order. The ultimate reason is probably the nature of the
foundational act of the post-independence State: the
fact that having begun and been defeated as a popular
insurrection —feared by both the Spanish and Creole
conservative elites— independence came eventually to
Mexico through ‘a virtual coup d’état by the colony’s
Creole elite, carried out largely to separate Mexico
from the liberalizing process under way in the mother
country’ (Coatsworth, 1978).
This had several consequences. Institutional
modernization was de facto and sometimes de jure
slow. A new civil code was only produced in 1870
—almost 50 years after independence— and even then
nothing replaced a repudiated commercial code. The
colonial mining code remained almost intact until
1877. Modern banking and patent laws were non-
existent. In spite of the provisions of the Constitution,
taxes and restrictions on domestic trade remained.
The system of government preserved the arbitrary
nature of political power in colonial times. Economic
success or failure depended directly on the relationship
between the enterprise and the political authorities
(Coatsworth, 1978, p. 94). In sum, while economic
activity remained ‘State-centered’, in the sense that
‘every enterprise was forced to operate in a highly
politicized manner’, the State, compared to colonial
4
 Not only were the direct effects of the independence wars on
mining production highly disruptive, but they also involved the loss
of low-cost guaranteed supplies of mercury (essential for processing
low-grade ores) that Spain had provided from its big State-owned
mine at Almadena.
5
 Ethnic distinctions in access to employment, justice and fiscal
treatment —which, among other things, had severely restricted
capital and labour mobility— were formally abolished; many
corporate privileges, including most of the guilds, were eliminated,
while corporate property rights were limited to the Church and the
Indian communities and town councils. The number of royal
monopolies on the production and distribution of many commodities
was reduced and their activities regulated; efforts were also made
to modernize the judiciary and revise archaic judicial codes.
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times, had in fact been weakened and was unable to
remove the obstacles to economic development
resulting from the decline of mining activity, foreign
competition, and the lack of transport infrastructure and
financial capital. Economic and industrial stagnation
therefore followed, as a consequence of the persistent
lack of markets and their fragmentation.
2. Liberal misperceptions in the mid-nineteenth
century?
This list of obstacles to economic development in 19th
century Mexico is equally significant for what it excludes.
Thus, recent revisionism by economic historians suggest
that two of the traditional culprits —the land tenure
system and the economic power of the Church— were
not in fact among the major causes of economic
stagnation during this period.
The system of land tenure and agricultural
production had been organized since the 17th century
into large estates called ‘haciendas’. While highly
inequitable and, to this extent, socially and
macroeconomically inefficient, the hacienda system
was far from a semi-feudal organization that
encouraged waste and misallocation of resources.
Recent research has produced a new image of the
hacienda as a capitalistic and technologically dynamic
undertaking with an economic rationality comparable
to that of a modern agricultural enterprise, and one
which extensively exploited its comparative advantages
—economies of scale, and access to external credit and
information on new technologies and distant markets.6
A ‘division of labour’ had, in fact, been established
through time between the hacienda and other forms of
agricultural production —small landowners, tenant
farmers or Indian villagers— whereby each of them
had specialized in those products and crops where they
enjoyed a competitive advantage: cattle, sheep, wool,
food grains, pulque, sugar and sisal in the haciendas,
and fruits, tomatoes, chiles, silk and small animals such
as pigs and poultry in the villages and small-scale
producers.
A similar revisionism of traditional judgments
applies to the Church as an economic institution. By
the middle of the 19th century, the Church had become
the country’s largest single landowner and an important
lender in the emerging financial markets. With respect
to its first role, according to Coatsworth (1978 and
1990) several studies suggest that Church haciendas
were at least as well managed as private haciendas;
and, in any case, after independence most of these
estates were rented to private farmers and hacienda
owners, so that their efficiency did not depend on
Church administration. On the other hand, the Church
appropriated the tithe (‘diezmo’), a 10% tax on gross
output, levied mainly on agricultural and livestock
production. Like any other tax, the tithe reduced the
profitability of agricultural production and probably
discouraged it (although some authors have doubts
about this).7 More important, however, is the use to
which these revenues were put. Far from financing
wholly ‘unproductive’ expenditures, the Church
invested a considerable portion of its revenues
(including also private donations and net income from
its various properties) in loans to private entrepreneurs
with no legal or practical restrictions to prevent
recipients from investing in factories rather than
haciendas or other activities. In doing this, it lent at
below-market interest rates —usually at a rate of 6%
on loans secured with real property. Because it
dominated the mortgage-lending market, this probably
had the effect, in turn, of bringing market interest rates
down. As Coatsworth (1978) has put it, the Church
acted like a modern development bank, raising the rate
of capital accumulation above what it would have been
in the absence of the tithe.
If this revisionist approach by economic historians
is correct, then some of the main elements of the liberal
economic programme —free trade, the privatization of
corporate and public property, and the liberalization of
the land market— were largely misdirected from a
strictly (and admittedly narrow) economic development
perspective. The first (free trade) probably gave a
further stimulus to the decline of local manufacturing
—and to the ‘ruralization’ of the labour force— as the
expansion of railways in the late 19th century sharply
reduced the natural protection provided by traditionally
high transport costs. The second, the privatization of
corporate property, had the effect of destroying the
major, and for a long time practically the only, banking
institution in the economy; while the third, the
7
 See, in particular, García Alba (1974) and Coatsworth (1978).
The reason is that the effect of the tithe in pushing labour and ca-
pital out of private agriculture was probably very small because the
Church itself, and the Indian villages, produced a major portion of
the country’s farm products and livestock. In any case, the net effect
on GDP was probably positive, since differences in productivity
between private agriculture and the rest of the economy suggest
that non-agricultural activities were already more productive than
agriculture.6 See, among others, Van Young (1981 and 1986).
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liberalization of the land market, was to contribute to
further land concentration and, eventually, to the social
explosion of 1910.
This does not mean, of course, that the
conservative faction was any better. Although some of
its members, Lucas Alamán in particular, had the merit
of pioneering the first, and short-lived, industrialization
efforts in the 1830s —through industrial protection and
the creation of the first public development bank
(Banco de Avío) to finance the development of the
textile industry—8 the social and political forces that
supported them tended to perpetuate the same arbitrary
centralism of political power that had had such harmful
effects on economic development since colonial times.
As a result, the coalition that could have forged a
developmental State did not emerge, and in its absence,
some of the main obstacles to economic development
remained in place. The liberals who could and were
willing to carry out the country’s political and social
modernization were also furiously anti-Statist in
economic terms; while the only ones who favoured
economic modernization through an interventionist
State were the conservatives, who were strongly
opposed to political and social modernization. It would
take a social explosion and a popular revolution in the
early 20th century to bring these two requirements for
economic development into a less conflictive
relationship.
8
 Another figure worth mentioning is Estevan de Antuñano, a creole
industrialist, whose many pamphlets best articulated the case for
protectionism and industrialization.
9
 For statistics of economic growth during the Porfiriato, see Beatty
(2001), Rosenzweig (1965), and Solís (2000).
III
The traumatic emergence of a Gershenkronian
developmental State
1. The Porfiriato: political stability and the
emergence of a unified national market
In practice, modern economic growth began in the late
19th century.9 In 1895, 72% of the population lived in
rural areas and more than 80% of those aged ten and
above could not read or write (table 3). In 1877, when
Porfirio Díaz seized power, 42% of Mexico’s GDP was
generated by rural activities and only 16% by
manufacturing (table 1). In the following two decades,
a turnaround in Mexico’s long-term decline gradually
became evident. The barriers to economic recovery
were brought down by the transformation of the
international economic environment and the internal
changes in Mexico’s political and economic structure
that took place under the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz
(1877-1910), a 33-year period of political stability aptly
named the Porfiriato by Mexican historians.
Melding a liberal political background with
conservative economic goals, the Porfiriato’s ideology
is summarized in the positivist slogan of “Order and
Progress”. Order was considered a sine qua non for
economic growth. The end of the military and political
struggles that had plagued Mexico since its
independence was seen as an essential pre-condition
for business confidence and the recovery of private
investment. Strengthening of the central government
was efficiently pursued, and by combining the use of
force and alliances with relevant groups, Díaz was able
to take full hold of the political structure.
Progress, for its part, meant transforming Mexico
into an industrialized nation by effectively addressing
some of the traditional barriers to economic recovery,
such as the lack of transport infrastructure and financial
capital.10 To foster the expansion of the railway
network, the State awarded concessions and financial
incentives. The subsidies granted for railway
construction amounted to 50% of the total cost. The
expansion of the railway system enormously amplified
the size of the market, brought down local and regional
trade barriers, and intensified competition.11 This effect
10
 The importance of these obstacles to economic development was
well recognized at the time. In the words of Matías Romero: “This
nation…has in its soil immense treasures of agricultural and mine-
ral wealth, which cannot currently be exploited due to the lack of
capital and communications..” (cited by Rosenzweig, 1965).
11
 The railway system expanded from 900 km to 19,000 km in the
1880s. According to Coatsworth’s estimates, this brought an 80%
reduction in freight costs per kilometer between 1878 and 1910.
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was reinforced by the significant improvement in the
safety of road travel achieved by the Díaz regime.
Foreign investment was another key aspect of
Díaz’s development strategy, and was actively sought
after through various incentives. These inducements and
the profitable investment opportunities that existed led
to an inflow of foreign capital. From 1880, United States
capital flowed in, later followed by European
investments (Coatsworth, 1989). These flows increased
continuously for the next 15 years, and boomed in
particular in the first decade of the 1900s (King, 1970).
More generally, State policies were geared to promote
private investment and guarantee the best conditions for
its operation. The legal framework for the conduct of
private business was soon transformed. In 1883 new
legal codes for trade and mining were adopted to
improve the conditions for private investment. Regional
taxes on domestic trade were abolished. Trade policy
combined focused tariff protection consistent with
supporting industrialization in the consumer goods
sectors and a reduction in average tariffs that enhanced
manufacturers’ access to low-cost capital and
intermediate goods (Beatty, 2002; Kuntz Ficker, 2002).
Foreign investment meant access to world
markets, and between 1870 and 1913 Mexico’s exports
increased threefold as a share of GDP. The expansion
of foreign trade also helped to increase government
resources, as taxes on foreign trade provided more than
half of public revenues. Greatly helped by the
depreciation of silver at the end of the 19th century,12
the export sector became an engine of growth, as it had
been in colonial times. This time the export basket was
considerably more diversified than in the colonial
period, as it included, besides silver, other minerals
—industrial metals such as copper, lead and zinc,
demand for which by the industrial centers of the world
economy was expanding rapidly— as well as a number
of agricultural products (coffee, livestock and others
which were added to others that were already of some
importance in the composition of exports such as
henequen, furs and wood). Accompanying these policy
changes and the responses to them was a more
propitious external economic environment. By 1870
the second industrial revolution in the industrialized
countries had spurred demand for minerals and other
raw materials. Combined with the end of political
instability, the new environment helped to restore
international creditworthiness.13
What was the overall outcome of this strategy in
terms of development? Economic growth and
TABLE 3
Mexico: Population and social indicators, 1895-2000
Year Total population Rural population Life expectancy Literacya Average years
(millions) (per cent) at birth (years) (per cent) of schoolingb
1895 12.6 72 30 17.9c ...
1910 15.2 ... ... 27.7 ...
1930 16.6 66.5 33.9 38.5 ...
1940 19.7 64.9 38.8 41.8 2.6
1980 68.3 33.7 66.2 83.0c 4.6
1990 81.2 28.7 70.8 87.4 6.6
1995 91.2 26.5 73.6 89.4 7.2
2000 97.0 25.4 75.3 90.3b 7.6
Source: Maddison (1989) and INEGI (various years).
a Population age 10 or above.
b Age 15 or above.
c Age 6 or above.
12
 The depreciation of silver was provoked by the adoption of the
Gold Standard towards 1870 in the advanced countries (Cárdenas
and Manns, 1989). It amounted to a continuous real devaluation of
the Mexican peso by 26% up to the beginning of the 1890s. See
Zabludovsky (1984), who assesses both the view, held by
Rosenzweig (1965) and Nugent (1973), that devaluation promoted
export-led growth, and the purchasing power parity-based view of
Limantour (Porfirio Díaz’s Minister of Finance), according to which
the depreciation of silver was ultimately reflected in the price level.
Zabludovsky’s (1994) evaluation of the evidence supports the first view.
13
 After having defaulted on its external debt on six different
occasions between 1824 and 1880, in 1889 the Mexican government
finally reached an agreement with foreign bankers on rescheduling
Mexico’s foreign debt. By the early 1890s, the country’s access to
international capital markets was restored and, between then and
1911, Mexico’s external debt increased 300%, mostly to finance
public works in infrastructure.
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modernization was felt in many areas, reversing a
century of decline, and from 1877 to 1910 Mexico’s
per capita GDP increased at an annual average rate of
2.1%.14 The railroad boom benefited some traditional
activities —such as mining—15 and at the same time
helped in the creation of new activities whose
production scales and capital intensity had made them
unprofitable in the absence of a unified national
market. Indeed, underlying this modernization was
Mexico’s first wave of large-scale industrialization.
Through import substitution in textiles, beer, paper-
making, cement and steel, manufacturing output
increased at an average rate of 3.6% per annum from
1877 to 1910 (Coatsworth, 1989). Manufacturing
changed from being an artisanal activity, carried out
in small handicraft workshops, to a productive process
undertaken in large-scale plants. The rural areas were
also deeply transformed in their social and economic
structure. Based on a diagnosis of the rural sector as
unproductive, with most agricultural output distributed
through non-market channels, the Díaz administration
promoted an accelerated process of redistribution of
federal and communal land to private development
companies and wealthy individuals. Such privatization
would promote large-scale commercial cultivation. By
1890, 20% of Mexico’s total area was held by less than
50 individuals or companies. By the early 1900s, 95%
of all arable land was in the hands of 835 families
(Manzanilla Schaffer, 1963).
By the early 1900s, however, this pattern of
development started to show symptoms of exhaustion.
From 1903 on, real wages began to decrease in a
systematic and persistent way. Droughts in 1907
reduced the output of food products, and furthermore
increased their prices. By 1910, the cumulative decline
in real wages was 26% relative to 1903. Although there
were no clear signs of famine, poverty was widespread,
especially in rural areas.16 At the same time, the use
of force to repress labour and suppress political
opposition became more frequent and eventually
unsuccessful. By 1910, the system’s unequal
distribution of benefits and access to power reached its
limit. The emerging middle classes excluded from
political decisions, and the workers and peasants
marginalized from the benefits of economic growth,
were successful in developing a triumphant coalition
under the banners of political democracy, agrarian
reform and labour rights.
What had gone wrong? Clearly, the Porfiriato’s
‘primary contradiction’ was in its results: the growing
imbalance between rapid economic growth, on the one
hand, and the slow pace of political and social progress
on the other. Porfirio Díaz had set out to make Mexico
into a modern industrial nation, but by 1910 only 28%
of Mexicans could read and write, and life expectancy
at birth was not much more than 30 years (table 3).
With two-thirds of its population still living in rural
areas, Mexico had still a fundamentally backward
economy and, overall, a backward society. Moreover,
while the emergence of a national market had broken
through some of the barriers of stagnation, the limited
role of the State proved insufficient to overcome the
still enormous obstacles to economic development.17
2. Revolution and the consolidation of a
developmental State
In 1910 the “Pax Porfiriana” came to a dramatic close
with the Mexican Revolution. Once more, the absence
of social consensus became the fundamental obstacle
for Mexico’s development. The construction of a stable
social pact would be fully achieved only three decades
later.
The most violent stages of the Mexican
Revolution ended with the adoption of a new
Constitution in 1917. Political unrest continued for the
next ten years —marked by the killing of important
figures such as Zapata, Carranza and Obregón, and
numerous uprisings— but the scale of the armed
struggle diminished significantly. The 1917 Constitution
redefined the legal framework for land ownership and
labour relations. It placed the nation over and above
private property in matters regarding land, water and
subsoil resources; established the right to form trade
unions, a system of minimum wages, eight-hour
workdays within a six-day workweek, and equal pay
for equal work; and included agrarian reform through
the expropriation of large land holdings and the
14
 See Bortz and Haber (2002).
15
 Mining would most likely have remained abandoned without the
railway expansion, as neither the necessary capital inputs for its
development nor the commercialization of mineral products would
have been profitable.
16
 As noted by Haber (1989), the extent of poverty was such that
the increase in the price of maize due to a bad harvest was capable
of reducing workers’ consumption of manufactures by enough to
provoke a crisis in the cotton garment industry.
17
 Public investment never amounted to more than 5% of total
investment, and only 7% of public expenditure was directed at capital
formation purposes.
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allocation of this land to ‘ejidos’, a land tenure system
combining collective ownership with private
exploitation of the land.
A fundamental move towards the consolidation of
social peace and political stability was the creation of
the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929.18
Renamed Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM) in
1938 and Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in
1946, this official party encompassed all the important
social forces of the Mexican Revolution and soon
became a functional vehicle for political control and
the only legitimate arena in which to settle political
differences. By the 1940s, the age of Caudillos was
over, and Mexico’s particular form of institutionalized
authoritarian control had begun.
The process of consolidation of political power
after the Revolution was accompanied by an expansion
in the policy instruments available to the government.19
Under the presidency of Cárdenas (1936-1940), the
public sector expanded further, with the creation of
several development or financial entities. Most
important, the oil industry was nationalized and
agrarian reform began to be implemented on a massive
scale. Fiscal policy became counter-cyclical and budget
deficits were run to boost productive and social
investment. Public expenditure was reoriented away
from military and administrative spending. The
highway system increased sevenfold, reaching 9,900
km by 1940. In addition, temporary flotation of the
exchange rate led to a depreciation of the peso in real
terms.
With the turnaround in the conduct of government
policies and the extraordinary recovery in the terms of
trade in silver and oil (the country’s main exports),
Mexico resumed growth in 1933-34. The first new
round of investment since the Porfiriato began in
manufacturing and was concentrated in new textile
activities. Manufacturing became the most dynamic
sector of the economy.
3. The post-war Golden Age of industrialization
(1940-1980)
In the process of achieving hegemony, the Mexican
State arrived at a strong conviction that it should play
an active role in investment and production if Mexico
was to develop. By the late 1940s, it controlled
fundamental resources and had increased the number
of its policy instruments significantly. Public
investment expanded systematically (table 4) and was
oriented towards urban and industrial development.
Additional incentives such as tax concessions were
used to promote manufacturing activities. Investments
in education and welfare maintained their share in
federal expenditure. The industrialization drive also
came hand in hand with a deepening of trade
protection, and by 1947 protectionism had been
officially adopted as a government intermediate
objective.
A complete overhaul of the economy and society
took place between 1940 and 1980. Mexico’s economy
grew at a sustained pace of 6.4% per annum in real
terms, while per capita GDP grew by 3.2% per annum.
Manufacturing became the engine of growth, with rates
of growth of production of 7.4% per annum from 1940
to 1955, and it further accelerated its pace of
development from 1957 to 1970, expanding at annual
rates of 8.9%, with the dynamic domestic market as
its major source of demand. The country was
transformed from an agrarian one into an urban, semi-
industrial society. Between 1940 and 1980, the share
of manufacturing in the product rose from 15.4% to
24.9% (table 5) and the share of the population living
in urban areas soared from 35% to 66%, while total
population increased from 20 to 70 million people
(table 3). Literacy rates nearly doubled, reaching 83%
18
 For detailed accounts of the creation of the PNR and its role in
long-term political stability, see Newell and Rubio (1984).
19
 The Bank of Mexico was established in 1925, and started to
operate as a central bank in the early 1930s as a response to the
Depression. By then, the National Agricultural Credit Bank had been
established, and the creation of other banks followed. In 1933, the
Budget Ministry created the National Finance Entity, which was
soon to become the Nacional Financiera: the first fully-fledged
development bank and the financial pivot for industrial and other
long-term investment.
TABLE 4
Mexico: Investment rates, 1900-1980
Year  Total investment Public investment




1930  9.4  2.2
1940  9.3 3.5
1960 17.2 5.2
1980 24.8  11.4
Source: ECLAC and INEGI.
a 1895.
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in 1980. The average number of years of schooling of
the adult population jumped from 2.6 to 7.1, and life
expectancy at birth increased 24 years to 65 (table 3).
Despite these improvements, however, the benefits of
growth were far from being evenly distributed. By the
end of the period, 20% of the population received more
than 50% of total disposable income, while 58% of
Mexicans were still living in a state of poverty.20 Thus,
at the end of Mexico’s Golden Age, poverty and
inequality were still major problems to be solved.
The macroeconomic performance from 1940 to
1970 was undoubtedly impressive, and the strategy on
which it was based tackled important obstacles on the
road to Mexico’s development. However, it ignored or
underestimated the magnitude of other obstacles.
The first of these obstacles arose from the neglect
of agriculture, which, after 1965, faced serious
difficulties in expanding production. Its rate of growth
in the second half of the 1960s fell below the pace of
population expansion. Among the factors explaining
this decline were the dual character of the sector, the
adverse trend in the prices of agricultural goods relative
to manufacturing goods, and the continuous decline of
its share in public investment after the 1950s. All these
elements contributed to an increase in poverty, a
contraction of the potential domestic market, and a loss
of social cohesion which led to emergent social
instability.
Secondly, while trade protection proved a
valuable instrument for promoting growth and import
substitution in many sectors, there was no explicit
policy, either from the private or the public sector, to
strengthen over time the economy’s export potential.
Neither was it clear whether the policy as it stood could
complete the most difficult phase of import substitution
involving high-technology capital goods.
Finally, tax reforms systematically aborted, and
public finances became increasingly dependent on
external debt.21 So too did the balance of payments,
20
 Less conservative estimates put this figure as high as 63% (see
Hernández Laos, 1989).
FIGURE 1
Mexico: Gross domestic product, 1921-1997
Source: Solís (2000).
21
 By 1972, the debt/GDP ratio and the debt-service/exports ratio
had both reached 18% (compared to 1% in 1946). While these mag-
nitudes did not yet imply a serious macroeconomic imbalance, they
reflect the dynamic evolution of foreign indebtedness during the
period.
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TABLE 5
Mexico: Structure of GDP, 1895 – 2002
(Percentages)
1885 1910 1926 1932 1940 1955 1970 1970 1980 1980 1990 2000-2002
(based on 1960 prices) (based on 1980 prices) (based on 1993 prices)
Agriculturea 29.1 24.0 19.7 24.1 19.4 18.3 11.6 12.2 9.0 7.1 6.7 7.6
Mining 3.0 4.9 9.3 7.2 6.4 4.8 4.8 2.5 3.3 1.4 1.5 2.1
Industry 9.0 12.3 14.7 13.3 18.7 22.1 29.7 30.1 31.9 25.0 24.1 27.0
(Manufacturing) (7.9) (10.7) (11.6) (10.2) (15.4) (17.5) (23.3) (23.7) (24.9) (19.2) (19.6) (21)
Services 58.9 58.7 56.3 55.4 55.5 54.7 53.9 55.2 55.8 66.5 67.6 63.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Banco de México and INEGI.
a
 Includes livestock, forestry and fishing.
which became more and more vulnerable to short-term
capital flows, with their potentially destabilizing
influence. As long as the Golden Age of world
economic growth continued, misperceptions regarding
the potential importance of these issues could remain.
Unfortunately, this Golden Age was coming to an end.
4. “Shared development”, the oil boom and the
debt crisis
Insofar as the administrations of the 1970s did not
solve these obstacles, they could, and did, become
painfully costly. The new Echeverría administration
which took office in late 1970 had as a central point
of its political platform the claim that the ‘stabilizing
development’ strategy of the 1956-1970 period had
failed to address the fundamental problem of
inequality. A new strategy of ‘shared development’
was therefore proposed in which the benefits from
economic growth would be more evenly distributed. In
practice, however, the policies adopted failed to fulfill
this objective.
Temporarily, the strategy did have the intended
impact on the functional distribution of income. Gil
Díaz (1987) shows that the share of labour in the net
national product went up from 40% in 1970 to 43% in
1972-1974 and reached 49% in 1976. In addition, GDP
achieved an average rate of growth of 6.1% per annum.
Unfortunately, these achievements were accompanied
by the emergence of severe macroeconomic
imbalances.
This was due to a number of reasons. On the
external front, the collapse of the world’s Golden Age
took its toll on the Mexican economy. The first oil
price shock found Mexico as a net importer of oil and,
together with the decline in external demand, tightened
the balance of payments constraints on growth.
Moreover, the increase in domestic inflation rates to
the 20% range, the expansion of public investment, and
a fixed exchange rate tripled the trade deficit between
1970 and 1975. The model of industrialization also
began to show some signs of exhaustion. Investment
was carried out to modernize plants in old sectors
already exposed to foreign competition, but failed both
to increase exports significantly and to deepen import
substitution in the capital goods sector. Insofar as tax
reform was not addressed, public revenues lagged
behind. The fiscal deficit climbed from 2.5% of GDP
to 9.9% between 1971 and 1976, and was increasingly
covered through monetary expansion and external debt
(which increased at an average annual rate of 40% from
1973 to 1976).22 In addition, private enterprise did not
find fertile ground in the ‘shared development’ rhetoric,
and soon the economy’s expansion was being driven
exclusively by public spending. Eventually, the
situation worsened significantly as a result of capital
flight. Notwithstanding the increase in import controls
and tariffs, balance of payments pressures forced the
government to depreciate by nearly 100% in 1976, thus
abandoning the exchange rate parity that had remained
fixed for more than 20 years.
22
 The belief that development, especially social development, could
be accelerated while sacrificing fiscal discipline was rightly criticized
by orthodox economists at the time. See Solís (1977) for a forceful
statement of this view.
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Despite the severity of the 1976 crisis, in a year
or so the economy’s prospects were completely turned
around with the announcement of Mexico’s vast oil
resources. Their exploitation and sale in the
international market brought a swift and strong
recovery. The trade deficit was brought under control
again, averaging 1.5% as a share of GDP. The term
profile of foreign debt was restructured and, for a
while, new indebtedness did not grow noticeably. An
ambitious industrialization plan was launched on the
assumption of a sustained long-term increase in the
price of oil. Manufacturing investment soared, boosted
by public and private entrepreneurship, and GDP growth
reached rates of 8% to 9% per annum between 1978
and 1981. A major tax reform was also carried out in
this period, and these changes reduced some of the
inequities of the Mexican tax system.23
However, with the benefit of hindsight, there were
already some worrying signs by the late 1970s. The
inflation rate had reached a plateau of around 18% and
did not show any signs of going down. Interest
payments were increasing as nominal rates in the
international credit markets floated upwards in an
unprecedented way. Few investments were directed to
the export sector, although two exceptions are worth
noting: the motor-vehicle industry —where a new
generation of plants was being built with state-of-the-
art technology, explicitly designed to compete in world
markets— and the petrochemicals sector, where the
public sector was investing heavily.
IV
The shift in the balance between the market
and the State since the mid-1980s
During the 1980s, the Mexican economy was subject
to two major external shocks: the 1982 debt crisis
which increased debt service and curtailed new external
finance, and the 1986 oil price shock which
dramatically cut off a major part of the country’s main
source of foreign exchange and fiscal revenues. These
external shocks brought to an end the long period of
rapid economic expansion.
By the early 1990s the foreign exchange and fiscal
gaps that were opened by the debt crisis and the oil
shock had been closed after a succession of orthodox
and heterodox attempts at stabilization. In the
meantime, a ‘great transformation’ had been taking
place, if we may appropriate the expression that
Polanyi used to refer to events of a different scale.
Balance of payments liberalization and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have closely
integrated the economy with that of the United States,
both in terms of trade and capital flows. Foreign
participation in the economy has increased through
direct investments in new plants, as well as mergers
and acquisitions, following the elimination of
restrictions on foreign ownership. State banks and
public enterprises have, with few exceptions, been
transferred into private hands. Privatization revenues,
together with debt relief (under the 1989 Brady Plan)
and fiscal adjustment, allowed the government to
reduce its debt, as a proportion of GDP, to rather low
levels by international standards. A market-oriented
rural economy emerged following far-reaching changes
in the land tenure system, price policies, and the
privatization or elimination of State enterprises and
their substitution by a combination of subsidies and
public programmes. In sum, a massive reform process
was carried out with a view to giving a larger economic
role to the private sector and greater scope to market
forces, and to accelerating integration into the
international economy.24
23
 An adjustment for inflation was introduced in personal income
taxation, and a value-added tax and a new corporate income tax
were established. The tax base broadened as loopholes were closed,
and the whole administrative and control process was simplified.
The contribution of the one to five minimum wage bracket to labour
income tax collection went down from 58% in 1978 to 28% in
1981, while the contribution of the highest wage bracket —more
than 15 minimum wages— went up from 8% to 25% of the total.
For a detailed description, see Gil Díaz (1987).
24
 For a detailed review of the reform process, see Lustig (2002).
For an excellent in-depth analysis of the changing pattern and
eventual decline of the Mexican Presidents’ authoritarian role in
the design and implementation of economic policy, see Cordera
and Lomelí (2000).
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1. Privatization and economic efficiency
The case for greater selectivity in State participation
in the economy and, indeed, for disengagement by the
State from a number of productive activities, has been
based on macroeconomic grounds: a government with
limited access to credit markets, pressing social needs
to be met, and a private sector with ample financial
resources abroad ready to be invested in previously
State-dominated activities which do not have a high
social priority. The case is certainly extremely
powerful. But this is so for macroeconomic reasons
related to the special conditions of the 1980s and has
less significance for the long-term growth potential of
the economy, beyond the promise (which so far largely
remains just that) of a considerable expansion in human
capital investments made possible by the huge
privatization revenues.
There is also, of course, the more traditional
microeconomic case for privatization based on the
notion that greater participation by the private sector
will bring about improvements in the overall efficiency
of investment. If the latter is a positive function of the
share of private investment in overall investment, then
part, if not all, of the fall in the overall rate of
accumulation could be compensated by a shift in the
composition of investment. As shown in table 6, there
was indeed a dramatic shift in the composition of
investment during the 1980s: the share of the private
sector in total fixed investment rose from 56% in 1980-
1981 to 76% ten years later and then to 84% by the
late 1990s.
The first point to be made in addressing this issue
is to recognize that the efficiency of overall investment
does not depend only on its private/public sector
composition, but also on the rate of investment itself,
which affects investment efficiency through its
consequences on the age distribution and the structure
of the capital stock (residential/non-residential, net
investment/depreciation). Now, as clearly shown also
in table 6, the shift in the private/public composition
of investment was a result of the absolute decline in
TABLE 6
Mexico: Structure of gross fixed capital
(Billions of 1993 pesos and percentages)
Investment
Total Public Private
GDP Billions % of GDP Billions % of total % of GDP Billions % of total % of GDP
investment investment
1980 948.6 206.3 21.8 88.8 43.0 9.4 117.5 57.0 12.4
1981 1 029.5 239.8 23.3 108.8 45.4 10.6 131.1 54.6 12.7
1982 1 024.1 199.6 19.5 88.3 44.2 8.6 111.3 55.8 10.9
1983 988.4 143.1 14.5 56.5 39.5 5.7 86.6 60.5 8.8
1984 1 022.1 152.3 14.9 58.8 38.6 5.8 93.5 61.4 9.1
1985 1 044.5 164.3 15.7 59.3 36.1 5.7 105.0 63.9 10.0
1986 1 012.3 144.9 14.3 50.9 35.1 5.0 94.0 64.9 9.3
1987 1 029.8 144.7 14.1 44.6 30.8 4.3 100.1 69.2 9.7
1988 1 043.0 162.5 15.6 40.6 25.0 3.9 121.9 75.0 11.7
1989 1 085.8 171.9 15.8 43.5 25.3 4.0 128.4 74.7 11.8
1990 1 142.0 194.5 17.0 48.4 24.9 4.2 146.1 75.1 12.8
1991 1 190.1 215.8 18.1 48.7 22.6 4.1 167.2 77.4 14.0
1992 1 232.3 239.2 19.4 47.1 19.7 3.8 192.2 80.3 15.6
1993 1 256.2 233.2 18.6 47.3 20.3 3.8 185.9 79.7 14.8
1994 1 312.2 252.7 19.3 64.9 25.7 4.9 187.9 74.3 14.3
1995 1 230.6 179.4 14.6 44.6 24.8 3.6 134.9 75.2 11.0
1996 1 293.9 208.9 16.1 38.0 18.2 2.9 170.9 81.8 13.2
1997 1 381.5 252.8 18.3 41.8 16.5 3.0 211.0 83.5 15.3
1998 1 449.3 278.8 19.2 38.7 13.9 2.7 240.1 86.1 16.6
1999 1 503.5 300.3 20.0 42.9 14.3 2.9 257.4 85.7 17.1
2000 1 602.3 334.4 20.9 54.5 16.3 3.4 279.9 83.7 17.5
2001 1 597.2 314.9 19.7 47.5 15.1 3.0 267.5 84.9 16.7
2002a 1 611.7 310.9 19.3 50.9 16.4 3.2 260.0 83.6 16.1
Source: ECLAC and INEGI.
a Preliminary figures.
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the rate of public investment, rather than of an absolute
increase in private investment: as a fraction of GDP, in
the early 1990s the latter was still at approximately the
same levels as ten years earlier, and it was only 3 to 4
percentage points higher in 2001-2002. Thus, if the
share of private investment in overall investment
increased, this was largely due to the collapse of public
investment rates. Unless the productivity of public
investment was actually negative —and nobody to our
knowledge has argued this— the efficiency losses
resulting from the absolute fall in the overall rate of
investment are bound to outweigh any efficiency gains
brought about by the shift in its composition. The rise
in the capital/output ratio since 1982 is fully consistent
with this conclusion.
In addition, the relationship between the efficiency
and the composition of overall investment is
undoubtedly more complex than generally assumed. It
is likely to have the shape of a Laffer curve, with low
efficiency levels being consistent with both too high and
too low shares of public investment. This is so because
public investment itself, as much recent empirical
research suggests,25 positively affects the productivity of
private investment, and thus at low levels of public
investment further reductions can bring about losses
rather than gains in overall efficiency. Given the sharp
contraction of public investment during the 1980s, and
the fact that the microeconomic efficiency gains and
performance improvements of the newly privatized
enterprises are yet to be seen in most cases, the question
arises as to whether the economy moved to the wrong
side of the Laffer-type curve. In such circumstances, an
increase in public investment in areas with high social
returns and high positive externalities for the
productivity of private investment is the best way of
addressing the problem of investment efficiency.
2. Trade liberalization, productivity and growth
The results of the trade policy reform are also
controversial. Let us look first at the static efficiency
gains expected by classical trade theory.26 One of the
striking features of the Mexican transition towards a
liberalized trade regime is the smoothness of the
microeconomic processes of resource reallocation. The
absence of massive reallocation processes is revealed
by the fact that current trends in the trade pattern and
industrial structure are largely an extrapolation of the
past. Beyond a few exceptions —such as the rapid
expansion of labour-intensive maquiladora exports in
the 1990s— the reallocation processes have witnessed
an extrapolation of past trends in the trade and
industrial patterns marked by the increasing importance
of heavy intermediate goods, consumer durables and
capital goods. The counterpart of this smoothness and
of the lack of reversal in the direction of structural
change in manufacturing is, however, that the classic
efficiency gains expected from trade liberalization
cannot be very large. For those expecting a large,
painful but greatly beneficial reallocation of resources
in favour of traditional exportable goods, which are
labour- and natural resource-intensive, the experience
with trade liberalization to date must have been, in
reality, very disappointing.
In our view, two major factors explain these
developments. First, and perhaps paradoxically, the
adjustment to the debt crisis and declining terms of
trade in the 1980s, and then later the adjustment to the
1994-1995 financial crisis, forced macroeconomic
policy to provide unprecedented levels of ‘exchange
rate protection’ which facilitated the adjustment of
industrial firms to a more open economy. The second
is simply Mexico’s successful import-substitution
experience in the past and the advanced stage that intra-
industry (and intra-firm) processes of specialization and
trade had already reached by 1980, including those in
the capital-intensive, large-scale manufacturing
industries which have been partly responsible for the
export boom of the last two decades. The industrial
policy reforms of the late 1970s, especially in the
automobile industry, gave a further impulse to those
processes. The incentives provided later by a very
competitive exchange rate and by the mid-1980s trade
reforms thus fell on already fertile ground. The
outstanding export performance of Mexico’s
manufacturing is therefore, to a large degree, a legacy
of the import substitution period and highlights in a
very real sense its success: it did indeed lead to an
irreversible change in the economy’s structure of
comparative advantages.
What were the dynamic effects of trade liberalization
on productivity and growth performance?27 In the
25
 In the literature on public capital, see the studies by Aschauer
(1989a, 1989b, 2000), Deno (1988), Munell (1990), and Easterly
and Rebelo (1993), among others.
26
 For a detailed discussion of resource reallocation processes see
Ros (1992) and, in particular, Moreno-Brid (1988) for an analysis
of a most important aspect of these processes: i.e., the restructuring
of the automobile industry and its role in the 1980s manufacturing
export boom. 27
 For a more detailed analysis, see Ros (1992 and 1993).
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economy as a whole, labour productivity has stagnated
since the early 1980s (compared to a trend growth rate
of the order of 4% per annum between 1950 and 1973
(table 7), and this applies to the periods both before
and after the 1985 trade reform. At the same time,
growth in manufacturing productivity shows a recovery
in the post-trade liberalization period since 1985
compared to the first half of the decade. Although it is
difficult to disentangle it from other effects, including
those of privatizations, industrial policy and a declining
real exchange rate from 1988 to 1994, the contribution
of trade liberalization to productivity growth appears
to have been positive in a number of manufacturing
industries where it has facilitated a greater degree of
intra-industry (and intra-firm) specialization or has
shaken out less efficient producers. However, the
benefits of the greater penetration of imports, in terms
of productivity performance, become much more
doubtful in other cases, which also show a rapid
displacement of local producers resulting from
increased exposure to foreign competition. Here, the
result of import penetration has been a worsening of
both output and productivity performance, whether
compared to historical trends or to the period
immediately preceding trade liberalization.
Thus, while liberalization in the fields of trade
(and foreign investment) have resulted in fast export
and labour productivity growth in a limited number of
sectors, overall economic growth has remained
problematic. GDP growth finally resumed at relatively
fast rates from 1996 to 2000, but it did so in an
exceptionally favourable international environment,
and the recovery turned out to be short-lived. The
renewed appreciation of the peso eventually slowed
down the export boom, and the recession of the United
States economy starting in 2001 put an end to the short
period of export-led growth. Since 2001 the economy
has stagnated and income per capita is very likely to
fall in 2003 for the third consecutive year. Rapid and
sustained economic growth is yet to be seen.
This experience raises serious doubts about the
ability of the current industrial structure to generate
self-sustaining growth. The counterpart of the
processes of intra-firm and intra-industry trade
specialization is that many, if not most, exporting
sectors and firms, while dynamic, lack domestic
linkages and a number of other industries have
witnessed a ‘disintegration of linkages’.28 Moreover,
the increasing dominance of the maquiladora industry
in export activities is a motive for concern. The
maquiladora industry is characterized by a low
potential for productivity growth: the counterpart of its
high capacity of employment absorption. As the real
exchange rate has appreciated again in the recent past
and dollar wages have increased, profit margins have
declined in the face of low and stagnant labour
productivity. This, together with the United States
recession, has put a brake on the expansion of
production capacity and output in the maquiladora
sector and has led to a sharp decline in employment
starting in the third quarter of 2000. In the absence of
productivity growth, the maquiladoras constitute a
sector that can only expand on the basis of low wages.
Given the tendency of wages to increase in other
sectors along with productivity gains, the maintenance
of the ‘internal competitiveness’ of the maquiladoras,
i.e., their capacity to attract resources from the rest of
the economy, would require a continuously
undervalued currency.29
3. Financial liberalization, the capital surge and
the financial crisis
If the efficiency and productivity effects of the market
reforms have been unable to make up for the loss of
28
 Dussel (2000) illustrates this with a case study of the
pharmaceutical industry, where the share of locally produced raw
materials fell from around 80% in the late 1980s to around 20%
in 1998.
29
 For an analysis of the performance of the maquiladora industry
in the 1990s, see Frenkel and Ros (2003).
TABLE 7
Mexico: Employment, working hours and
labour productivity
1950 1973 1990 1998
GDP per person employeda 7 685 18 399 20 747 20 810
Labour productivityb 03.6 08.9 10.1 10.0
Employment, as a percentage
   of the population 30.8 26.3 29.4 32.0
1950- 1973- 1973- 1990-
1973 1998 1990 1998
Growth of GDP per hour
   workedc 4.1 0.5 0.7 –0.04
Source: Maddison (2001).
a In 1990 international dollars.
b GDP per hour worked (1990 international dollars per hour).
c Annual average compound growth rate.
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growth potential during the 1980s, what about their
effects on external capital inflows and the prospects for
increasing the rate of accumulation by these means?
Would the shift in the market/State balance bring about
a permanently higher flow of external savings
—significantly greater than historical rates— that
would allow an increase in the rate of accumulation,
despite the sharp decline of the domestic savings rate?
Such was the optimistic outlook of many observers in
the early 1990s, for whom Mexico —a model reformer
and successful emerging market— would turn into a
Latin American economic miracle. These optimistic
expectations reached their peak when NAFTA was
approved in 1993.
The market reforms and positive external shocks,
such as the fall in foreign interest rates in the early
1990s, together with the beginning of the NAFTA
negotiations, contributed in three main ways to a
capital surge from 1990 to 1993 (Ros, 1994). The first
was the liberalization of domestic financial markets.
The second was a drastic reduction in the country risk
premium —an improved image of Mexico as a ‘good
place to invest’— as a result of the debt relief
agreement, the fall in international interest rates and
the repayment of foreign debt, financed by the large
privatization revenues of 1991-1992. The third, which
interacted with the reduction of country risk, was the
real appreciation of the peso and the very high interest
rates that prevailed in the initial stages of the anti-
inflation programme of late 1987.
The size and composition of capital inflows,
which were heavily biased towards short-term portfolio
investments, had three consequences for the economy.
First, the continuous appreciation of the real exchange
rate, which was taking place in the midst of a radical
trade liberalization process, produced a profit squeeze
in the tradeable sectors of the economy, with negative
consequences for investment (Ros, 2001). Second, as
a result of the difficulties in intermediating the massive
capital inflows, an allocation of resources biased
towards consumption rather than investment
(Trigueros, 1998) reinforced the decline in the private
savings rate, while the bias towards the production of
non tradeable goods, together with the real
appreciation, resulted in slow economic expansion.
Third, increasing financial fragility, due to the
concentration of the inflows in highly liquid assets,
accompanied a progressive deterioration of the banking
system balance sheets (Trigueros, 1998).
These trends should have given rise to legitimate
concern in the field of economic policy. They did not
do so, however. By 1993, the current account deficit
reached levels of the order of 6-7% of GDP, and by early
1994 the capital surge was over. Throughout 1994 the
authorities financed the massive current account deficit
through the depletion of international reserves. Clearly
there was an incorrect diagnosis by the government of
the causes of the macroeconomic disequilibria, as it
was considered that the pressure on the reserves and
the dilemmas facing policy makers were temporary and
would be corrected without the need for depreciation
of the exchange rate. Thus, no significant depreciation
of the exchange rate was implemented, on the grounds
that it would rekindle inflation and would ‘give
alarming signs to the market’, augment capital flight
and trigger a balance of payments crisis. That policy
was slowly but steadily being perceived as non-
sustainable by investors in Mexico’s capital and money
markets, however. In the course of the year, the Bank
of Mexico not only had to authorize increases in the
interest rates on CETES (Treasury Certificates) and
Tesobonos (Mexican Treasury Bonds), but also had to
allow for greater guarantees on the rates of return on
government paper payable in local currency but tied
to the nominal exchange rate with the United States
dollar. In any case, the foreign exchange reserves kept
being depleted, ultimately forcing the authorities to
perceive that their macroeconomic policy was
unsustainable. At the end of 1994, scarcely a year after
NAFTA came into effect, the Mexican economy was in
the midst of a financial crisis and on the brink of the
worst recession since the Great Depression of the
1930s. Moreover, the country had been experiencing
instability and political violence throughout 1994,
starting with the armed revolt of the Zapatistas in
January (on the same day that NAFTA came into effect).
The boom and bust cycle that culminated with the
1994-1995 banking crisis was a consequence, at least
in part, of excessive reliance on financial deregulation
and capital market liberalization (Clavijo and
Boltvinik, 2000; Lustig, 2002; OECD, 2002). The
aftermath of that cycle was a bankrupt banking system
whose bailout added some 20 percentage points of GDP
to the public debt and left those households and
firms—mostly small and medium-sized enterprises
with no access to foreign finance— virtually without
access to bank credit. It is ironic that the banking
sector returned to a situation of credit rationing
characteristic of the era of financial repression that
preceded the financial liberalization of the late 1980s.
This situation has been an obstacle to faster growth and
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has also reinforced the dual structure of the productive
sector.30
4. Recent growth and investment performance
After the decline of 6.2% in real GDP in 1995 —the
sharpest drop in more than fifty years— economic
growth resumed in 1996-2000. However, its expansion
abruptly stopped in 2001-2002 and per capita GDP
actually declined in real terms. On average, from 1985
to 2002, GDP expanded at an annual rate of 2.2%, or
barely half a percentage point above the rate of
population growth. Furthermore, the most recent
figures indicate that Mexico’s per capita GDP remained
stagnant in 2003. Thus, at the end of that year, in
constant dollars it was little more than 20% of the U.S.
per capita GDP: a gap almost 10 percentage points wider
than in 1981 and similar to the level recorded fifty
years earlier. In other words, in these five decades the
Mexican economy has so far failed to “catch up” in
any significant way with its northern neighbour in
terms of real per capita GDP.
Crucial to the slowdown in Mexico’s rate of
economic expansion has been the weak investment
performance.31 The failure of capital formation to grow
at a fast pace —after the years of decline during the debt
crisis— has impeded the expansion and modernization
of productive capacity and simultaneously restricted the
growth of aggregate demand. Indeed, gross fixed
investment followed a path similar to that of GDP in real
terms. It increased rapidly during the oil boom, then
collapsed in 1982-1987, and began a slow recovery in
1988 (figure 2). This rebound gained some strength in
1990–1992 in response to the favourable expectations
associated with the beginning of the NAFTA negotiations,
only to be cut short in 1995, but it vigorously resumed
30
 Giugale, Lafourcade and Nguyen (2001) and Dussel (2000)
document how the credit decline affected large firms and small and
medium-sized enterprises differently and the large and increasing gap
between the export performance of these two types of enterprises.
31
 For a extensive analysis of the performance of investment in
Mexico’s manufacturing sector after the macroeconomic reforms
see Moreno-Brid (1999) and Mattar, Moreno-Brid and Peres (2003).
FIGURE 2
Mexico: Investment/GDP ratio, 1970-2002a
Source: Prepared by the authors from table 4 of Mattar, Moreno Brid and Peres (2003), on the basis of ECLAC and INEGI data.
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in 1996–2000. However, in 2001-2002 investment
again fell in real terms. In synthesis, during the last two
decades the investment process has been wanting.
The disappointing performance of investment
gives grounds for concern over Mexico’s future
economic growth. What are the causes behind it? Were
there any limitations or shortcomings in the
macroeconomic reforms that failed to consider or
misperceived the nature of key determinants of
Mexico’s investment process? Recent research on the
topic has identified a set of factors that help explain
Mexico’s poor investment performance (Mattar,
Moreno-Brid and Peres, 2003).
First, the reforms were adopted in a stagnant
economy with severely rationed access to foreign or
domestic capital and finance. The adverse economic
environment was aggravated by the fall in public
investment, because “crowding in” between public and
private investment has historically been more important
than “crowding out” effects (UNCTAD, 2003).
In addition, the reforms had the explicit goal of
eliminating all types of incentives, including measures
to promote domestic investment (both aggregate and
in specific sectors). No attempt was made to orient
domestic spending towards investment as opposed to
consumption expenditure. Such explicit refusal to
promote investment was combined with the uncertainty
inherent in any radical change in development strategy.
Not surprisingly, such uncertainty was far from favourable
to investment, thus leading to the postponement or
interruption of investment projects. The elimination of
sectoral incentives had an especially strong adverse
impact on manufacturing investment, given that
manufacturing had traditionally been the most favoured
sector under the previous development model based on
import substitution and State-led industrialization. This
lack of incentives —exacerbated by the intense and
sudden competition from imports— reduced
manufacturing’s relative rate of return, which in turn
curbed investment. The appreciation of the real exchange
rate in 1988-1994 vis a vis the United States dollar
further conspired against investment in manufacturing
and, more generally, in the tradeable goods sectors as
a whole. While real exchange-rate appreciation can
encourage fixed investment in developing countries by
lowering the relative prices of imported machinery and
equipment, it also shifts relative prices in favour of
non-tradeables, inducing a reallocation of labour and
investment away from the production of tradeable
goods and services. This latter effect appears to have
predominated in the Mexican case.
5. State reform and the tasks of development
policy
The other side of market reform is the retreat of the
State and its restructuring. By shrinking in size, there
is a better chance that the State will be able to do a
better job in its priority tasks. Or so the argument goes.
However, the mere fact that the State is smaller does
not necessarily mean that it will be more effective. The
tax burden in Mexico continues to be extremely low
by international standards (OECD, 2002). At 12% of GDP
in the late 1990s, tax revenues are below those of Latin
American countries with similar per capita income and
well below those of OECD countries. As a result, the
fiscal accounts continue to be highly vulnerable to
changes in oil income, which still represents around a
third of total government revenues. Together with the
loss of policy instruments and the reorientation of
monetary policy from growth to purely stabilization
objectives, as well as the volatility of external capital
flows, this gives rise to a major macroeconomic
problem, since it contributes to pro-cyclical
macroeconomic policies that exacerbate the negative
effects of shocks on economic activity.
Nor is the State necessarily more efficient. Despite
(or perhaps because of) its massive character, Mexico’s
fiscal adjustment did not encourage greater internal
efficiency of the public sector. Especially before 1985,
fiscal adjustment was, by and large, achieved through
deep cuts in public investment and the real salaries of
public employees: hardly the best way of improving
the efficiency of the State and its bureaucracy.
Moreover, the retreat of the State has gone well beyond
areas where the private sector has a comparative
advantage. In fact, public infrastructure investment has
been the main victim of fiscal adjustment in the context
of falling oil prices. Giugale, Lafourcade and Nguyen
(2001) strikingly illustrate with two figures the close
correlation between oil price declines, fiscal deficit cuts
and reductions in public investment (the correlation
coefficient between the last two was 0.82 over the
period from 1980 to 1997). As a result, public
investment was barely 3% of GDP in 2001-2002,
compared with 5% in 1994 and 10% in 1980-1981
(table 6). It is also clear that, despite some positive
recent trends in social spending, State disengagement
has not served its main stated purpose: the expansion
of social infrastructure. The main contribution of
privatization revenues was to support stabilization
efforts (very effectively, no doubt) by temporarily
compensating for the fall in the inflation tax and
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strengthening the capital account of the balance of
payments through the financial assets that the private
sector had to bring back home to purchase the public
enterprises on sale.
The implications of all this are more important
than is generally acknowledged because the priority
tasks of the State —social policy in particular— are
today far more formidable than in the past. This is so
for several reasons. There is, first, the accumulated
backlog of unmet social needs and the legacy of
increased inequality from the 1980s. In the face of slow
growth in agriculture and the expansion of the urban
informal sector, the recovery of social spending in the
1990s has not prevented an increase in the number of
poor and a persistently high level of inequality in
income distribution. Lustig (2002) shows that income
inequality, as measured by the Gini concentration
coefficient, increased quite sharply from 1984 to 1989
(around four percentage points) and then fell from 1989
to 1994 (although remaining slightly above its 1984
level). Since then, however, the OECD (2002) estimates
show a slight increase in income inequality between
1994 and 2000, with the Gini coefficient rising from
0.477 to 0.481. Poverty rates (both extreme and
moderate) show a similar behaviour across time, while
the number of poor shows a continuous increase
through 1994.
Secondly, there are at least two ways in which the
present development pattern is exacerbating social
disparities. The State’s retreat from agriculture and the
reform of the land tenure system may have brought
private capital and prosperity to some rural areas, but
they have also inadvertently tended to impoverish large
masses of rural workers in a similar way that
agricultural modernization under the Porfiriato did
deliberately and on a much more massive scale. There
has been a clear difference between the behaviour of
the commercial sector producing exportable goods —which
benefited from and responded positively to the reforms
(exports have grown by 70% during the first five years
of NAFTA)— and the ejido sector which has not done
so (imports grew by 60%, adversely affecting this
sector which largely produces importable goods).
Today, this sector barely survives through increasing
integration into off-farm activities, with about 40% of
its income coming from non-farm sources, including
remittances (Giugale, Lafourcade and Nguyen, 2001).
As those authors acknowledge, the overall stagnation
of agricultural output and the persistency of rural
poverty are related to the reforms themselves. The
downward trend in real agricultural prices throughout
the 1990s was strengthened by the removal of trade
protection (and exchange rate overvaluation in the early
part of the decade). The elimination of extension
programmes and technical assistance has affected a
large proportion of small producers. The retreat of the
State from distribution was followed by the domination
of marketing channels by oligopolistic intermediaries
who depress the prices obtained by producers, affecting
particularly the poorest areas. In the absence of
competitive markets, and without proper consideration
of the large regional diversity and income heterogeneity
of the Mexican countryside, liberalization did not yield
the expected benefits.
On the other hand, the benefits of greater
integration with the international economy, and with
the United States in particular, are also being very
unevenly distributed within the country. Greater
integration has been accompanied by a substantial
increase in the wage premium on skilled labour, with
a resulting relative decline in unskilled labour incomes:
a major cause of persistent inequality. As documented
by Godínez (2000) and Dussel (2000), general regional
trends from 1970 to 1985 pointed towards a de-
concentration of economic activity (away from the
main industrial centres in the metropolitan area of
Mexico City, Nuevo León and Jalisco) and
convergence of regional income levels. Since 1988,
however, a process of divergence has been taking
place, especially as the northern states linked to export
activities have been rapidly increasing their share in
national income. By contrast, the relatively poor South
(with the exception of Quintana Roo, which has
benefited from the expansion of tourism) has been
lagging behind. These regional trends are clearly linked
to the economy’s structural changes, such as the
lagging cereal agriculture, expanding export sectors of
agro-industrial products, fruit and vegetables, and the
rapidly growing export-oriented manufacturing
activities in the Northern and Central areas. Just as in
the late 18th century the ‘opening of North Atlantic
trade’ exacerbated the ‘fragmentation of regional
markets’, there is today a tendency towards a deepening
of regional disparities, especially between a prosperous
north increasingly integrated with the United States
economy and a poor and backward south plunged into
agricultural stagnation.
Finally, but no less importantly, by abandoning
the trade and industrial policy instruments that have
worked successfully in the past without seeking
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